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Since the world began shifting its diplomatic recognition and economic
ties away from the Republic of China (Taiwan), and toward the People’s
Republic of China1 in the 1970s, the Taiwan government has solicited
political and economic support from smaller nations. As of early 2000,
Taiwan had formal relations with some twenty-nine countries, and most
of these ties were cemented with economic or other significant aid.
In seeking to broaden its international influence, Taiwan’s foreign pol-
icy has focused on both the large, developed nations that have probably
irrevocably switched recognition to China, and to less developed, often
smaller states. These smaller countries can offer full diplomatic ties, as
well as occasional voting support on important issues in international
forums such as the United Nations. With Taiwan’s legitimacy as an inde-
pendent entity constantly challenged by China, every foreign diplomatic
relation is counted as a significant achievement. In addition to these polit-
ical motivations, these countries are potentially lucrative foreign invest-
ment targets. Taiwan’s foreign aid is often the key to winning a new
embassy.
In earlier research, Gerald Chan examined Taiwan’s politically moti-
vated “southward policy” of courting mainly larger countries in South-
east Asia, and Chen Hurng-yu looked at Taiwan’s economic and invest-
ment ties to several of Asia’s developing nations (Chan 1996; Chen 1994).
Most of the target nations, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Viet-
nam, generally benefitted from the inflow of foreign capital, though it
constituted a relatively small part of their overall economies. Even with
no diplomatic relations in this part of the world, Taiwan gains some
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implicit political clout and moral support from its economic ties with the
countries of Southeast Asia.
Taiwan’s more successful diplomatic efforts have come in the least
developed parts of the world. Ian Taylor has focused on its competition
for recognition in African nations, where “dollar diplomacy” has won it
recognition by eight states (1998). Karl Fields has taken a wider view of
this economic statesmanship and explored the investment policies of Tai-
wan’s ruling Nationalist Kuomintang party in several parts of the world
(1998). However, few of these or other works focus on the use of Tai-
wan’s aid or investment in the small, developing states.
The results of Taiwan’s investment expansion in developing nations
have several implications for ties with other regions of the world, includ-
ing Pacific Island states. First, the movement allows it to diversify its eco-
nomic relations away from a growing number of investment projects in
neighboring China, which could be tempted to use the resulting leverage
for economic or political manipulation. As noted, Taiwan also stands to
improve ties with the target nations, even if diplomatic relations remain
informal. However, many developing countries have poor infrastructure,
and find absorbing funds difficult. On balance, the political pay-off to
Taiwan may outweigh any real economic gain for its investors, or even
for some of the recipient countries.
This essay extends the examination of Taiwan’s efforts to develop eco-
nomic and political ties with developing states, and focuses on the recently
independent nation of Palau. Palau has strengthened its economic and
political relations with Taiwan significantly since 1994, when it shed its
status as a United Nations trust territory administered by the United States.
Finally, in late December 1999, Palau extended official diplomatic recog-
nition to Taiwan. Here I examine strategies the Taiwanese government
and quasi-private industry have used to solidify ties with Palau, and the
effects these actions have had on Palau’s economic, as well as social and
political, development. 
I begin with a brief look at Taiwan’s relations with other Pacific Island
states, and touch on the ways it has fostered bonds with the small nations.
I then turn to the recent history of Taiwan’s move into Palau, and the
effects its strategy has had there. In examining Taiwan’s efforts, I consider
both beneficial and detrimental effects of its investment in Palau. I con-
clude with an assessment of current Taiwan-Palau economic ties, and
include lessons for Taiwan, Palau, and other potential clients of Taiwan’s
recent foreign-economic-policy drive among the smaller developing
nations of the world.
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Taiwan’s Relations in the Pacific Islands
As of early 2000, Taiwan had formal diplomatic relations with five Pacific
Island states: Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, and
Palau. Over the last three decades, Taiwan has competed with China for
recognition among many of the newly independent states in the region,
employing a number of strategies.2
In the 1970s, both China and Taiwan focused attention on nations such
as Fiji, Tonga, Sämoa (formerly Western Sämoa), and Solomon Islands.
Taiwan achieved some early success, opening a trade office in Fiji in 1971,
and establishing nonresident diplomatic ties with Tonga and Sämoa in
1972. Following a series of exchanged visits by Taiwan and Pacific Island
leaders, ties were established with Nauru, Tuvalu, and Solomon Islands at
various times in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1975, however, Taiwan
broke relations with Sämoa following that country’s switch to China. 
In October 1998, Tonga announced that it was switching its recogni-
tion from Taiwan to China. However, a month later the Marshall Islands
restored the balance when it established full diplomatic ties with Taipei.
For a short period in mid-1999, Taiwan’s allies in the Pacific included
Papua New Guinea, but the recognition was revoked in less than a month
by a new prime minister.
Taiwan’s strategies for developing ties have included more than recip-
rocal visits. In Fiji, for example, it offered cash grants, as well as techni-
cal and developmental assistance; Fiji, however, maintains official ties
with China. In Tonga, the Taiwanese funded a stadium construction pro-
ject, and in Solomon Islands they built a hospital. In October 1999, fol-
lowing establishment of diplomatic ties, Taiwan gave the Marshall Islands
$2 million to purchase two German airplanes (HA, 10 Oct 1999, a2).3 In
December 1999, Palau extended its ties to Taiwan.
Despite some success for Taiwan, many of the small Pacific states have
played the two Chinas off against each other in order to obtain the max-
imum economic and political benefit. To show its interest in the region,
the Beijing government has made pledges of agricultural assistance to
Sämoa and helped construct Vanuatu’s new parliament building. In sum,
the Pacific Island nations have used their not insubstantial leverage of
diplomatic recognition, along with an implied favorable UN vote on
issues of concern to both Chinas, to win economic favors from each of
the two claimants to Chinese rule. The pattern is one that the newly inde-
pendent Republic of Palau would be expected to follow. 
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Palau’s Economic Ties with Asia
Palau’s recent history has influenced both its political and its economic
ties with the major economic powers of the Pacific rim.4 Japan and the
United States, both former colonial powers in Palau, have played key roles
in the nation’s development, although Taiwan’s influence has increased
dramatically in recent years.
In the 1980s, the United States and Palau negotiated a Compact of Free
Association, an agreement that gives the US military rights in Palau for
fifty years, in exchange for some $627 million paid over the agreement’s
first 15 years (Osman 1997, 10). Palau, however, maintains control over
its own domestic and foreign policy. The compact took effect in 1994, the
same year Palau gained independence and jointed the United Nations.
The following year, the new nation received nearly $250 million in front-
loaded compact payments, though the allocation fell to about $120 mil-
lion in 1996, and to some $15 million in 1997, with similar annual income
set for the following twelve years. As payments decrease over later years,
and its military interests in the region weaken, the United States’ involve-
ment in the country’s affairs seems destined to decline.
Palau’s proximity to Asia makes it a natural candidate for interest from
wealthy neighbors to the north. The nation is approximately five hours
by air from Tokyo, and three-and-a-half hours from Taiwan. By the 1970s,
Palau was already being eyed as a major potential tourist attraction and
investment site.
Early moves from Asian investors came after the United States lifted
restrictions on foreign investment in 1974. Japanese who had been part
of the civilian workforce during the Japanese administration in the 1930s
visited Palau to see how they might resume their economic involvement.
Kazuhiko Kohno represented the Tokyu Land Corporation, which decided
to build a world-class resort to help spur the island territory’s tourist
industry. Tokyu spent the mid-1970s acquiring land-use rights for what
would become the Palau Pacific Resort. At the time, Tokyu, like other
potential investors in Palau, had to follow rules created by an indigenous
Foreign Investment Board; the board’s authority succeeded that of the
region’s US-appointed high commissioner, who previously had the author-
ity to approve foreign participation. But the board reportedly followed
the desires of Palau’s president (first elected in 1980), and financial incen-
tives rather than projects’ merits may have influenced the approval pro-
cess at times. The luxury resort cost some $25 million to build and took
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nearly eight years to complete, but it opened to burgeoning tourist inter-
est in December 1984. As the tourist industry began to take off in Palau,
other Japanese investors arrived to emulate the early hotel’s example.
Table 1 gives the numbers and origins of tourists arriving in Palau over
the past decade.
Early interest from Taiwan investors also came in the mid-1980s, as
independence appeared on the horizon and tourist interest grew. Taiwa-
nese who saw the rising potential invested in the medium-standard Palau
Hotel, which cost $1 million to build. For the following decade, though,
most other hotel projects were initiated by Japanese investors, and there
was relatively little interest from Taiwan businesses. 
One key problem in expanding foreign investment was the delineation
of property rights. Following the long history of colonization by the Span-
ish, Germans, Japanese, and Americans, land ownership rights had
become unclear. However, one rule remained firm: only Palau citizens
Table 1. Tourist Arrivals in Palau by Origin, 1986–1998
USA Japan Philippines Europe Taiwan Korea Others Total
1986 3,747 6,567 1,578 568 — — 1,193 13,653
1987 4,205 6,924 1,915 916 — — 2,735 16,695
1988 4,821 10,818 2,194 1,121 — — 3,721 22,675
1989 6,060 11,633 2,764 1,105 — — 4,443 26,005
1990 6,440 13,212 3,528 1,674 — — 7,992 32,846
1991 6,411 14,529 4,073 1,202 — — 6,485 32,700
1992 8,032 17,021 4,032 1,527 — — 5,505 36,117
1993 7,861 18,554 3,622 1,722 — — 8,738 40,497
1994 9,700 17,493 3,554 2,207 6,126 1,221 3,772 44,073
1995 9,846 21,052 3,199 2,508 11,163 1,823 3,638 53,229
1996 9,955 22,619 3,838 2,870 23,309 2,074 4,665 69,330
1997 10,481 20,507 2,955 1,521 31,246 1,782 6,951 73,719
1998 12,487 21,571 na na 18,503 545 na 64,194
Note: na = not available.
Sources: Figures for 1986–1996 are from Osman (1997, 20). The 1997 and 1998
figures for USA, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and totals are from Tia Belau (22 Jan
1999, 1, 9; 6 Feb 1999, 6); other 1997 figures are projected from Osman 1997,
therefore totals do not add.
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could own land in the republic. Citizenship was limited to those who
could prove Palauan ancestry, but foreigners could lease land for periods
of up to fifty years.
In recent years, Taiwan has shown renewed interest in Palau. Taiwan
tourism has become a major part of Palau’s visitor industry, and in 1996
the number of Taiwanese tourists exceeded those from Japan for the first
time. The progress of this interaction is outlined in the following section.
Taiwan’s Overtures: Tourism and Investment in Palau
By the early 1990s, it was clear to the Taiwan government that Palau
would soon join the list of small island nations that might extend diplo-
matic relations to Taiwan.5 Not only could Palau add to the list of offi-
cial diplomatic representatives in Taipei, but its UN membership and
other international participation could add more votes to initiatives
favored by Taiwan and the Kuomintang.
Some eighty delegates from Taiwan attended Palau’s independence cer-
emony on 1 October 1994. Their arrival followed the creation of an
“agricultural mission” that apparently had support from the Taiwan gov-
ernment (TB, 31 Dec 1994, 3). Soon after, Palau’s President Kuniwo Naka-
mura accepted an invitation to make a three-day trip to Taipei in March
1995. His visit was notable for the warm reception he received from Tai-
wan’s President Lee Teng-Hui (PG 27, 31 March 1995, 7). In July of the
same year, a delegation of twenty-seven Taiwan businesspeople visited
Palau for further talks (PG 31, 31 July 1995, 2).
The early discussions were facilitated by Palau’s rather liberal policy of
allowing Taiwan citizens to obtain visas on entry to the country. This
made Palau one of the few areas in the world that citizens of Taiwan could
visit while avoiding the tedious process of approaching a foreign repre-
sentative’s office and waiting long periods for permission to enter. In April
1995, Continental Micronesia doubled the number of its flights from Tai-
pei to Koror to accommodate the rapidly growing number of tourists (TB,
20 May 1995, 4). Initial enthusiasm for these ties ran high among Palau-
ans, who believed the Taiwanese would supplement the large number of
Japanese tourists who had been visiting the islands since the 1970s for div-
ing and vacation.
At about this time, tourism assumed a more important place in the
minds of the leaders of the newly independent republic. Although the
American compact payments amounted to a fantastic windfall, future
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years would see diminished income. Tourism was seen as an industry that
could fill the gap of declining revenues. By 1992, the sector represented
some 10 percent of Palau’s overall gross domestic product. Fishing still
accounted for about 29 percent, with government service (16 percent)
and construction (8 percent) making up the other main segments of the
economy (Osman 1997, 9).
As Continental moved to expand service, Taiwan’s own domestic car-
rier, Far East Air Transport, began talks in May 1995 to establish charter
flights to Palau. The airline is reportedly owned 56 percent by the China
Development Corporation, the venture-capital company of the Kuom-
intang (TB, 12 Aug 1995, 1, 10). After only two months of talks, Far East
Air began flying to the island republic in July, with corporation chairman
Liu Tai-ying arriving on the maiden flight (PG 31, 31 July 1995, 2). The
service, initially called Air Palau, started with two flights a week, and
soon put an end to Continental’s service. The next month, President Naka-
mura made another visit to Taipei to discuss the ongoing tourist interest
in Palau.
Palau appeals to Taiwan tourists for several reasons. In addition to
receiving a visa on arrival, the flight to Palau is relatively short. Air tick-
ets cost about 10,000 New Taiwan dollars (nt, equal to about us$300),
and tour packages start from nt$20,000. Far East Air promoted the
travel as a weekend escape for young people too busy to travel greater
distances. Table 2 shows the number of passengers on Far East Air flights
in the service’s first three years of operation.
The growing number of Taiwanese visitors helped build a special rela-
tion between Palau and Taiwan. For Far East Air and Taiwan travel agen-
cies the business also proved profitable. A representative of the airline
interviewed in 1998 felt the number of visitors from Taiwan could even-
tually reach fifty thousand.
One of the problems in attracting more Taiwan tourists to Palau has
been the shortage of comfortable hotel space to meet demand. Only the
Palau Pacific Resort has met high international standards, and in the mid
1990s the total number of rooms available throughout the republic was
fewer than seven hundred. 
In January 1995, Dr David Chen, president of the Asia Pacific section
of the Kuomintang’s Central Investment Holdings Company, visited Palau
to discuss construction of a new world-class hotel. His partner in the pro-
ject was Alan Seid, a delegate from Koror in the Palau central government
and chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. In August 1995
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the two reached an agreement to build the Palasia Hotel, with joint-ven-
ture ownership. The Taiwan side held 80 percent ownership, and 20 per-
cent went to their Palauan partners. The hotel was built on Seid’s land in
Koror to avoid the problems associated with property purchases by for-
eigners. The company made rapid progress with construction, though vir-
tually all of the materials had to be imported. Most of the labor was pro-
vided by as many as two hundred Chinese workers sent to Palau for the
project. The company also invested in a pig farm, to guarantee a stable
supply of food for the hotel’s mainly Taiwanese guests.
The six-floor, 165-room hotel—the tallest building in the island repub-
lic—opened in August 1998, under the management of the Honolulu-
based Outrigger group, with daily room charges ranging from $182 to as
high as $778 for a suite in peak season. However, even at these rates, it
is unclear how long it will take the Taiwanese company to recoup its $40
million investment, which works out at about $250,000 per room.
Others in the Kuomintang business leadership joined in to support the
large hotel project and to reinforce Taiwan-Palau friendship. Liu Tai-ying
presided over a ceremony in the fall of 1995 to officially announce the
Palasia construction, and to pledge the China Development Corpora-
tion’s support for “projects ranging from fishery, tourism, banking, air-
line industry [to] infrastructure” (TB, 7 Oct 1995, 6). In October 1995, a
newly organized Taiwan-Palau Cultural, Economic, and Trade Inter-
change Association announced it was donating $50,000 to fund Palau’s
independence anniversary celebrations (PG 34, 31 Oct 1995, 3). Later, in
early 1996, the association, led by chairman Gino Chung-Chu Chen,
broke ground for a joint construction project known as the Palau Empire
Entertainment World. The project’s goal was construction of a $70 mil-
lion, 600-house resort village on Palau’s large northern island, Babeldaob
(TB, 6 April 1996, 1, 8). By mid-June 1996, nearly all of the houses had
reportedly already been purchased by Taiwan investors (TB, 17 June 1996,
13). However, the project’s fifty-year lease, renewable for another fifty
years, incited some local political leaders to protest the foreign-invested
development, and in 1999 the courts declared the lease void. With the
association’s offices now closed, it seems unlikely that the project will
ever be built—much to the chagrin of investors in Taiwan who reportedly
paid $75,000 for property in the resort (Shuster 2000).
Another Taiwanese-funded real estate project, the $50 million Hung
Kuo Resort, broke ground in August 1998. With some 407 rooms, this
luxury resort near Koror is much bigger than the Palasia, and includes
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Delegate Alan Seid’s investment of $3.2 million (TB, 6 June 1998, 3; 29
Aug 1998). Other Taiwan-invested projects included the Ever Fortune
Development Company’s plan to build two water system projects valued
at a total of $520,000 (TB, 17 Nov 1996, 1). President Nakamura made
another trip to Taiwan in May 1996 to open an “honorary consulate”
and attend President Lee’s inauguration as first elected president of Tai-
wan, and it seemed the country’s initiative to cultivate good ties was
beginning to bear diplomatic fruit. But Palau had pointedly avoided rec-
ognizing either Taiwan or China; this was one of many problems of Tai-
wan–Palau ties that have come to light in recent years.
Problems of Tourism and Investment 
Early controversy between Taiwan and Palau arose in late 1995. Some
unscrupulous investors sought to develop a scheme for circumventing
Palau’s strict landownership and citizenship rights. The republic’s Com-
merce and Trade minister had to deny allegations of his own involvement
in a plan to sell Palauan citizenship to Taiwanese, a status that was sup-
posed to allow the Taiwanese participants to purchase and develop land
(TB, 21 Oct 1995, 1, 10). Advertisements had appeared in Taiwan news-
papers, falsely implying that investors contributing several hundred thou-
sand dollars to a real estate project in Palau could obtain permanent res-
idence after one year, and citizenship after five years (TB, 23 Sept 1995, 1).
Such a scheme would appeal to citizens of Taiwan, who often find inter-
national travel cumbersome using a Taiwan passport.
Meanwhile, Taiwanese tourism in Palau was beginning to create sepa-
rate problems for relations with Taiwan. Conversations with Palauan
tourist officials reveal frustration with the environmental impact of
rapidly rising Taiwan visitor numbers. Unlike Japanese or western tour-
ists, many Taiwanese visitors apparently cannot swim. On visits to col-
orful coral reef areas, some tourists walk on (rather than swim over) the
delicate coral animals and damage them. The Palauans seem to have
developed (whether justified or not) a prejudice in favor of Japanese tour-
ists, who they believe are more respectful of the environment, and against
the Taiwanese, who are perceived as less considerate.
Problems of adverse environmental impact by the new wave of tourism
could grow in the future. A Far East Air representative noted that future
tourists to Palau may expect more entertainment than snorkeling and
scuba diving—they may want to see parasailing and other water sports
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available to enhance their Pacific Island vacations. This development
would follow the path of other vacation spots in the region, such as Guam.
In early 1998, Palau also was negotiating to introduce a ship-based casino
(NST, 12 March 1998, 19). The addition of these attractions might boost
tourist numbers, but would add to the environmentally unfriendly effects
of tourism.
Other Palauans complained about the effect of Taiwan’s tourism on
the domestic service sector. One travel agent noted that the inexpensive
tours from Taiwan had cut group tour prices from about $250 for a two-
day hotel and city tour package to only about $150. Some local restau-
rants also have become the exclusive domain of Taiwan tour operators
and other foreign investors. Foreign representatives can lend money to
create joint operations with Palauan “front” organizations that allow the
outside investors to skirt Foreign Investment Board regulations. Taiwan
tourists are guided to the quasi-joint-venture establishments, allowing the
Taiwan investors to reap profits from their compatriots. This leaves less
money to support the Palauan-owned restaurants. 
Other Taiwan interests have been accused of unethical behavior. The
Ever Fortune Development Corporation, which won bids to build two
water systems, may have skirted import tax rules to bring construction
equipment to Palau in 1995 (TB, 17 Nov 1996, 13). A Taiwan fishing com-
pany, Ting Hong, was accused of trying to bribe two members of Palau’s
Foreign Investment Board to obtain an investment permit (TB, 22 Feb
1997, 3). And in early 1998, the Far East Air Transport airport desk in
Palau was reportedly distributing a leaflet promoting a massage parlor
(TB, 25 April 1998, 3).
On the diplomatic front, success for Taiwan’s initiative long remained
elusive. In May 1997, President Nakamura led a delegation of Palauan
leaders to Beijing, to a warm welcome from the mainland Chinese leader-
ship (PG 53, May–June 1997, 4). Central Investment Holding Company’s
investors felt “betrayed” by this move, and their disappointment was
most likely shared by others in the Taiwan government. In May 1998, a
second Palau delegation returned from Beijing with a pledge of $500,000
toward the regional “Micro Games” athletic competition (TB, 23 May
1998, 10), and in late 1999 China donated $400,000 worth of luxury vehi-
cles to aid Palau’s hosting of the regional South Pacific Forum (TB, 13 Sept
1999, 3). For tourism purposes, though, China was less useful, as fewer
than a thousand of its citizens visit Palau each year.
According to officials in Palau, the republic purposely was playing off
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the two Chinas, and did not want to repeat the “mistake” of other Pacific
Island nations by recognizing one or the other. The Marshall Islands
briefly had relations with both Taiwan and China in late 1998, but China
cut ties after just a few weeks.
Taiwan’s early hopes may have rested on Palasia investor Alan Seid,
who was a potential presidential candidate in the 2000 election (TB, 12
Sept 1998). Other scholars in Palau, however, noted that subtle pressure
by the country’s traditional ally, the United States, might have prevented
Palau from choosing to recognize Taiwan. Finally, however, on 30 Decem-
ber 1999, the Palau government decided to extend formal diplomatic
recognition to Taiwan.
Future Development of Taiwan-Palau Ties
Though Taiwan’s battle for diplomatic recognition from Palau finally
bore fruit, the future of the Asian investment strategy seems murky. By
early 1998, Taiwan tourism to Palau had begun to slow, as illustrated in
Table 1. The loss in value of the New Taiwan dollar against the US dol-
lar made Palau more expensive for Taiwanese visitors.6 Alternative travel
destinations, such as Thailand or the Philippines, were more attractive, as
their currencies had fallen as much as or even more than Taiwan’s. Far
East Air Transport itself had begun charter flights to Subic Bay in the Phil-
ippines and noted that these trips represented competition for Palau vaca-
tion travel. Central Investment Holdings noted that some flights to Palau
in the first half of 1998 had as few as twenty passengers, though Far East
Air had begun flights from both Taipei and Kaohsiung to the Pacific
island. In mid-1998, however, Fare East Air cut the number of its weekly
flights from four to two.
In addition to exchange-rate problems, various taxes imposed by the
Palau government affected tourist attitudes toward their Palau vacation.
Airport departure tax, for example, was a rather high $20. Central Invest-
ment Holdings asserted that taxes were also charged on tourists visiting
the coral reefs around Palau’s Rock Islands. Growing traffic problems
and concerns for personal safety on the streets of Koror also make Palau
a less attractive vacation destination.
Despite the pessimistic forecast for the Taiwan-built tourist industry,
Taiwan’s investors had not yet conceded defeat in their move to Palau.
Central Investment Holding Company’s Dr Chen suggested the textile
and fishing industries could supplement the republic’s economic develop-
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ment, and noted that Taiwan corporations had great experience in these
areas and were exploring opportunities for investment. Other possibilities
for cooperation were for construction of monuments to World War II
battles, and for improving accommodations in islands remote from the
capital city, Koror. These last projects, though, were again dependent on
the continued growth of tourism. Overall, investments backed by Kuom-
intang business interests showed mixed results as of early 1998. Though
Far East Air appears to be making profits, Central Investment Holdings’
Palasia would seem to be in a bind if the tourism industry faltered.
Taiwan’s initial strategy for cementing ties with Palau seemed at first
to be faulty. Palau was content to court both Chinas, and apparently did
not want to cement relations with Taiwan no matter how many economic
tools the Taiwanese might employ. In September 1999, for example, a
vote to put Taiwan’s membership in the United Nations on the organiza-
tion’s agenda failed, though it was supported by the Marshall Islands and
Solomon Islands. Palau (and newly admitted Nauru) did not support Tai-
wan’s bid (IHT, 17 Sept 1999, 10).7
For the Palauans, Taiwan’s efforts had both positive and negative
results. Tourism and construction investments set the foundation for an
economy that could withstand the decline of American compact funds.
The Taiwanese also seemed interested in developing other industries, such
as fishing.
For Palau to truly benefit from these capital flows, however, the process
would require more thorough regulation by the island republic’s govern-
ment. Projects agreed to only after promises of large investment dollars or
quasi-legal alliances with local businessmen could prove ill-suited for the
economy’s long-term development needs. Improved government oversight
of foreign investment could help remedy these problems. But, if Palau’s
diplomatic dance between Taiwan and China were to eventually alienate
Taiwanese investors, all of the projects could disappear quite quickly,
leaving both Palauans and Taiwanese with little to show for several years
of effort. Though it is unclear as of this writing why Palau extended its
recognition, economic and political pressure from Taiwan was probably a
key factor in motivating the choice of that country over China. It is also
unclear, however, whether the March 2000 election of new Taiwan Pres-
ident Chen Shui-bian, leader of the kmt—opposition Democratic Progres-
sive Party—will affect Taiwan’s future ties with Palau and other Pacific
Island states.
Other developing nations may learn from Palau’s example. Taiwan is
478 the contemporary pacific • fall 2000
eager to find diplomatic recognition where it can, and investment and aid
dollars stand to follow political relations. But Taiwan’s motivation lies in
improving its own standing in the world, rather than in advancing the
interests of small nations. Palau’s experience tells nations that easy money
may follow ties with Taiwan, but it is up to the developing country to use
it wisely. Furthermore, the game of trying to balance China and Taiwan
against each other to obtain benefit from both cannot be played indefi-
nitely.
* * *
I wish to thank Dr Terence Wesley-Smith and two anonymous reviewers for
comments on early drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Dr Wali Osman of the
Bank of Hawaii for his kind help in introducing interviewees in Palau, and Dr
Edgar Porter of the University of Hawai‘i for helping arrange interviews in Tai-
wan. 
Notes
1 To avoid confusion, throughout this article the Republic of China is referred
to as Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China simply as China.
2 Some of the information in the following section is based on an article by
Biddick (1989).
3 In mid-1998, Solomon Islands requested $100 million from the visiting pre-
mier of Taiwan, but this sum apparently exceeded Taiwan’s willingness to pro-
vide aid (pir, July 1998).
4 Unless otherwise noted, information in the following section is derived
from interviews conducted in Palau in November 1997.
5 Unless otherwise noted, the following information is based on interviews
held with Taiwan business representatives in March 1998.
6 Palau uses the US dollar as its national currency.
7 Tuvalu is not currently a UN member state.
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